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This is the story of the hunt for the
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world's most dangerous hackers.
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Prologue. The bears.
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Once upon a time, there were five bears.
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They all lived in Russia.
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Each one was different in the things
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they liked and in the things they did.
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But they shared one important trait.
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Their metaphors nicknames for special
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units of Russian intelligence services.
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These units are made up of hackers.
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Some of the most dangerous in the world.
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They each have different objectives. To
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spy, to expose, to wreak havoc. But
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they're not just a threat to computers
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or networks. They're a threat to Western
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democracies. They're tools of
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destabilization, of psychological
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warfare, of political manipulation.
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They've already made it into the German
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Parliament, into the email inboxes of
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the country's elected officials. They
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threw their full weight behind Donald
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Trump's 2016 campaign.
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They travel the world working in the
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interest of Vladimir Putin's regime. And
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they've played a key role for years in
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Russia's brutal war against Ukraine.
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This documentary reveals who these
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hackers are, how they operate, and how
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we can protect ourselves from them.
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[Music]
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This documentary is largely based on a
[02:11] (131.36s)
fantastic German speaking podcast demon
[02:13] (133.92s)
and miracles Gashner by German
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investigative journalists Hakan Tanek
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Verde and Florian F link is in the
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description
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chapter 1 the email
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this story begins with that little line
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above the E and with Claudia height she
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was working in Berlin back then as an
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assistant to a member of the Bundistag
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the German national parliament her
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office is beautiful in the center of
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Berlin it's May 8th 2015
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A warm Friday in spring. The weekend is
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just around the corner. She's trying to
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write an email to a colleague named
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Renee. Hm. The accent IU doesn't work.
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Strange. She tries all the usual.
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Opening and closing Word, rebooting her
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PC. Nothing fixes the issue.
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The Bundesog has its own internal
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service hotline for that kind of thing.
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117. She tells the IT guys that she
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thinks her PC got infected with some
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kind of malware. Perhaps a Trojan. but
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they don't take her seriously. At this
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point, no one realizes how serious the
[03:16] (196.56s)
situation really is.
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There really was a Trojan on Claudia's
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computer. She'd been hacked. But it
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wasn't just her device. While she's
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still on the phone with 117, hackers are
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already deep inside the Bundesto
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systems. They're working on behalf of
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the Russian military intelligence
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agency, the GRU.
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Putin's bears are running wild right
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through the very heart of Germany's
[03:43] (223.20s)
political system.
[03:45] (225.36s)
If all this happened today, Claudia
[03:47] (227.04s)
could have just asked an AI assistant,
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probably way more helpful than that
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service hotline. With UDA's website app,
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8 days earlier on April 30th, 2015,
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dozens of MPs and their staffs received
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an email. It looked official, as if it
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came from the United Nations. The
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subject line referenced Ukraine and its
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economic situation. It's just a year
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after the annexation of Crimea, Russia's
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first military incursion into Ukraine.
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military operation is now underway in
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eastern Ukraine. The capital Kev and
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other Ukrainian cities have been hit by
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air and missile strikes over the past
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several hours.
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The situation in Ukraine was already a
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red-hot political issue. You had to stay
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informed. And if the UN sent something
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around, Claudia height and many others
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clicked. That single click was enough.
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Malware installed itself quietly in the
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background. No pop-ups, no warnings. The
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infection was silent, and from that
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moment on, the hackers had access.
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Their objective was clear. Gain
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administrator rights with those that had
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the digital equivalent of master keys,
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access to everything, the power to
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change anything.
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And they got what they came for. They
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broke into areas of the system that
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should have been completely off limits.
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That's how they were able to push deeper
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and deeper until they had essentially
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taken over the Bundisto's IT
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infrastructure. It was a sophisticated
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operation, carefully planned and
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executed. The attackers moved laterally,
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jumping from computer to computer,
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scanning for valuable information,
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documents, emails, anything of use.
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Eventually, they reached two machines
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inside a parliamentary office of the
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Conservatives.
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And not just any office, Angela Merkels,
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the German chancellor at the time.
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[Applause]
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The Bundesag hack is one of the most
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serious cyber attacks in German history.
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It will set off a large-scale
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international investigation and
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eventually arrest warrants that had once
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seemed unimaginable.
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And yet, inside the budistto itself, the
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attack goes unnoticed for quite some
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Back to that Friday afternoon call with
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117. Claudia is frustrated with how
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unhelpful the first hotline call had
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been. So, she does what most people do
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in that situation. She calls again,
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hoping the next person might actually
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understand what's going on. But even the
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second person on the line doesn't take
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her seriously. Angry and fed up, Claudia
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decides to just shut down her PC and go
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home. It is Friday after all, and the
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weekend has already begun.
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[Music]
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On Monday morning, an IT staffer
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remotely logs into Claudia's machine and
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reinstalls Word, which of course doesn't
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fix anything. By the afternoon, someone
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finally comes in person, but even they
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don't catch that there's a Trojan on
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Claudia's PC. By this point, the hackers
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have already been inside the system for
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at least 2 weeks. And still, almost no
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one realizes that this might actually be
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a cyber attack. Meanwhile, over in the
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UK, a cyber security firm has been
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keeping an eye on a suspicious foreign
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server. one that had been used for
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previous cyber attacks. Suddenly, that
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server establishes a connection to
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machines inside the Bundesto network.
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The firm alerts the Federal Office for
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the Protection of the Constitution. A
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day later, the warning reaches both the
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Bundesto's classified information office
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and the Federal Office for Information
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Security, BSI, and bond. Thanks to
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German bureaucracy doing what German
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bureaucracy does, the warning takes a
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brisk 3 days to actually land.
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Finally, someone realizes what's
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happening. The BSI sends a special team
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to Berlin. Their job, comb through the
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logs. Those are automatic records on
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computers that track what happened,
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when, and how. Which programs were
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opened? What was clicked? What ran in
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the background? All of it. The BSI team
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needs to figure out three things. Is
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this a major attack? Yes. What are the
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hackers after? Probably stealing data.
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And are they still inside? Very much so.
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The team doesn't hesitate. They shut
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down the entire network. From the
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outside, it looks like someone just
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ripped the plug out of the wall. Claudia
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watches her computer power off like it
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has a mind of its own, like it's
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haunted. She half expects the lights to
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flicker next.
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That same day, Dbigel broke the story,
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the first media outlet to report on the
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cyber attack. Politicians found out from
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the news, not from internal channels.
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From that moment on, chaos took over.
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Lawmakers were furious. No one could
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work properly. No emails, no access to
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documents, no reports. And this isn't a
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movie. You don't just kick the hackers
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out and move on. The network is giant,
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messy, and hard to control. The response
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team had to fight their way through it,
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trying to stop any further data theft
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and rest back control. It took weeks to
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clean the system. During that time, MPs
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and their staff could only use certain
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parts of the network. No one knew if the
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hackers were still reading their emails.
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Important notes were suddenly written
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down by hand again just to stay safe.
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The Bundesto's IT security was clearly
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overwhelmed. It faced intense criticism
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in the months after. When the dust
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finally settles, the investigation into
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the perpetrators begins and the trail
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points to Russia right from the start.
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On Claudia Height's computer,
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investigators find malware called X
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Tunnel. X tunnel functions like a real
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tunnel, a direct continuous link that
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allows attackers to access the network
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whenever they want. Inside the code,
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analysts uncover connections to a server
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believed to be used by a group known as
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A stands for advanced persistent threat.
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It's a label used for hacker groups that
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are not only highly skilled, but also
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extremely patient. The kind of intruders
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who don't just strike and vanish, but
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stay deeply embedded, sometimes for
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years. By all accounts, AP28 is a
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Russian group, and it also goes by
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another name, Fancy Bear.
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Fancy Bear operates under the GRU,
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Russia's military intelligence service.
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The group is notorious. This is where
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they work and what's known as the
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Aquarium in Moscow. No one knows who
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they really are. No names, no faces, not
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even how many of them exist. But one
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thing is clear. They do whatever it
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takes. They'll stop at nothing, not even
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the computer of the sitting German
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chancellor. Ironically, it's there in
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that highly sensitive office where one
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of the hackers slips up.
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They managed to break into a computer in
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Angela Merkel's outer office, her
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personal machine, her inbox. It's
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exactly what they were after. To extract
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the emails, one of the hackers writes a
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custom program. The tool is designed to
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copy her Outlook inbox and send that
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copy to a server they control. The
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program is called VSC.exe.
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But there's a problem. While coding, the
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hackers make a mistake. To locate and
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extract the files, VSC.exe needs to
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follow a specific file path. And that
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path includes the words abort.
[11:46] (706.24s)
But the program doesn't recognize the
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German oo. Instead, the character shows
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up as a garbled symbol, a question mark
[11:52] (712.56s)
followed by R O. So, the program can't
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find the folder. For a moment, the
[11:57] (717.20s)
entire operation stumbles over the
[11:58] (718.96s)
quirks of the German language. Realizing
[12:00] (720.96s)
the attack might be exposed at any
[12:02] (722.40s)
moment, the hackers panic a little.
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Under pressure, they decide to rewrite
[12:06] (726.08s)
the code. This time, they tell the
[12:08] (728.08s)
program, "Expect German. Expect that.
[12:09] (729.92s)
Oo." Then they try again. And this time,
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it works. The tool successfully copies
[12:15] (735.84s)
the inbox and sends it out. It's not
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Miracle's correspondence from the
[12:19] (739.44s)
Chancellory, but still a huge win for
[12:21] (741.84s)
the attackers.
[12:23] (743.52s)
But the hackers messed up. Maybe from
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the rush, maybe out of nervousness. In
[12:28] (748.72s)
the code of the program, investigators
[12:30] (750.56s)
later discover a critical detail. The
[12:32] (752.88s)
hacker forgot to delete the name of the
[12:34] (754.56s)
computer he was working on. The path
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reads, "See users Scaramooch."
[12:40] (760.88s)
Scaramu is a clown-like character from
[12:42] (762.72s)
Italian theater. People might also
[12:44] (764.72s)
recognize the name from Bohemian Rap
[12:48] (768.01s)
[Music]
[12:52] (772.00s)
That's the hacker's alias, his handle.
[12:54] (774.96s)
In secret, Scaramush and his team become
[12:57] (777.04s)
high priority targets. The Federal
[12:59] (779.12s)
Public Prosecutor's Office opens an
[13:00] (780.96s)
investigation on suspicion of espionage,
[13:03] (783.68s)
and Glimmer Merkel later calls it an act
[13:05] (785.52s)
of hybrid warfare. But publicly, the
[13:08] (788.08s)
German government keeps quiet at first.
[13:10] (790.08s)
No accusations, no pointing fingers. In
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total, around 16 GB of data is believed
[13:15] (795.60s)
to have been stolen from the Bundesto
[13:17] (797.04s)
network, though no one knows for sure.
[13:19] (799.44s)
16 GB doesn't sound like much, right?
[13:22] (802.24s)
Just an old USB stick. But in context,
[13:24] (804.96s)
it's a lot, especially if we're talking
[13:27] (807.44s)
only emails. 16 GB contains a staggering
[13:31] (811.12s)
amount of information. Hm. Is that
[13:33] (813.60s)
really the end of the world, though? A
[13:35] (815.20s)
little espionage here and there.
[13:36] (816.80s)
Business as usual. Sure, they stole some
[13:39] (819.52s)
files, but what could they really do
[13:41] (821.04s)
with that?
[13:42] (822.80s)
Then came the US presidential election
[13:44] (824.48s)
in 2016. Putin's bears shows what
[13:47] (827.20s)
they're really capable of. The Clinton
[13:49] (829.04s)
campaign won't confirm or deny the
[13:50] (830.64s)
veracity of any of the emails posted by
[13:52] (832.88s)
Wikileaks.
[13:53] (833.92s)
What lines they're willing to cross and
[13:55] (835.68s)
just how much chaos a few gigabytes can
[13:57] (837.60s)
unleash.
[13:59] (839.36s)
[Music]
[14:01] (841.20s)
Chapter 2, The Orange.
[14:09] (849.44s)
In mid 2015, Donald Trump announces his
[14:11] (851.84s)
candidacy. At first, no one really takes
[14:14] (854.80s)
him seriously, but because he's so
[14:16] (856.88s)
different, so unfiltered, saying things
[14:18] (858.96s)
no one else would dare, the media can't
[14:21] (861.04s)
stop talking about him.
[14:22] (862.56s)
And Mexico will pay for the wall.
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I could stand in the middle of Fifth
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Avenue and shoot somebody and I wouldn't
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lose any voters. Okay.
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One outrageous statement after the next
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dominates the headlines.
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ISIS is honoring
[14:37] (877.68s)
President Obama. He is the founder of
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ISIS. He's the founder of ISIS.
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There's public outrage, disbelief, and
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widespread support for him.
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I don't know what I said. Uh, I don't
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remember.
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By early 2016, Trump is no longer the
[14:51] (891.84s)
oddball outsider. He's now the
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Republican front runner, going
[14:55] (895.36s)
headto-head with Democrat Hillary
[14:56] (896.80s)
Clinton.
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Half a world away in the Kremlin,
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Vladimir Putin is watching closely. He
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doesn't like Hillary Clinton, not one
[15:06] (906.16s)
bit. The two have history. Back in 2011,
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Clinton was the US Secretary of State
[15:11] (911.12s)
when Russia held national elections. She
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publicly questioned whether the vote had
[15:15] (915.12s)
been rigged and massive protests
[15:17] (917.04s)
followed across the country. Putin
[15:19] (919.12s)
accused the US of stirring up those
[15:20] (920.80s)
demonstrations. He never forgave her for
[15:22] (922.96s)
that. Politically, she had been one of
[15:24] (924.80s)
his toughest opponents for years. Later,
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the European Court of Human Rights
[15:28] (928.64s)
confirmed that the 2011 Russian election
[15:30] (930.56s)
was in fact manipulated.
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Putin clearly is rooting for the other
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guy, the loud billionaire. Trump, for
[15:37] (937.28s)
his part, has repeatedly praised Putin
[15:39] (939.04s)
in the past. He sees Putin as a strong
[15:41] (941.52s)
leader, someone he thinks he could get
[15:43] (943.28s)
along with as president. So Putin
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consults with his three intelligence
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agencies, and makes a call.
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March 19th, 2016, an email lands in the
[15:54] (954.40s)
inbox of John Podesta, Clinton's
[15:56] (956.24s)
campaign manager. The message looks like
[15:58] (958.48s)
a standard Google security alert.
[16:00] (960.40s)
Something about suspicious activity and
[16:02] (962.08s)
a prompt to reset the password. But
[16:04] (964.32s)
Podesta double checks with an IT staffer
[16:06] (966.16s)
at the DNC to be sure. Unfortunately,
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the staffer replies that the email is
[16:10] (970.56s)
legit when he actually meant the
[16:12] (972.56s)
opposite. Just one typo with massive
[16:14] (974.80s)
consequences. Podesta assumes the
[16:17] (977.44s)
message is safe, clicks the link, and
[16:19] (979.20s)
enters his login on a fake site. That's
[16:22] (982.00s)
it. The hackers are in. They now have
[16:24] (984.24s)
access to internal communications,
[16:25] (985.76s)
emails, and nearly everything tied to
[16:27] (987.60s)
the campaign. They're part of Fancy
[16:30] (990.00s)
Bear, the same group tied to the
[16:31] (991.60s)
Bundesto hack.
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They steal 50,000 of Podesta's emails.
[16:37] (997.04s)
The tactic is known as fishing, casting
[16:39] (999.12s)
bait and waiting for a bite. Spear
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fishing, more specifically, as it's
[16:42] (1002.88s)
tailored to a specific person. With the
[16:45] (1005.44s)
same approach, Fancy Bear targets 300
[16:47] (1007.36s)
more people inside Clinton's campaign.
[16:49] (1009.44s)
No one knows how many fell for it. In
[16:51] (1011.60s)
early April, they go after another key
[16:53] (1013.36s)
target, the Democratic Congressional
[16:55] (1015.44s)
Campaign Committee, DCCC, a central
[16:58] (1018.40s)
player in the Democratic election
[16:59] (1019.84s)
machine. Using more convincingly real
[17:02] (1022.24s)
looking emails, they manage to steal the
[17:03] (1023.92s)
credentials of at least one DCCC
[17:05] (1025.84s)
employee. And just like that, they're in
[17:08] (1028.24s)
again.
[17:10] (1030.72s)
Once inside, Fancy Bear uses two main
[17:12] (1032.96s)
types of malware, X Agent and X Tunnel.
[17:15] (1035.76s)
The latter is the same tool used in the
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attack on Claudia Heights computer in
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Berlin. While digging through the DCCC,
[17:21] (1041.92s)
the hackers find something even more
[17:23] (1043.44s)
valuable. Credentials that let them slip
[17:25] (1045.68s)
into the Democratic National Committee,
[17:27] (1047.44s)
DNC, the heart of the party. There they
[17:30] (1050.64s)
uncover detailed documents on campaign
[17:32] (1052.32s)
strategy, including a file on Trump full
[17:34] (1054.48s)
of potentially damaging information.
[17:37] (1057.60s)
In early May, the intrusion is finally
[17:39] (1059.44s)
detected. The DCCC and the DNC hire a
[17:42] (1062.96s)
cyber security firm to clean house, a
[17:45] (1065.44s)
process that will stretch all the way
[17:46] (1066.80s)
into October. But the Democrats should
[17:49] (1069.12s)
have discovered the hackers much sooner.
[17:52] (1072.14s)
[Music]
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In a small, unremarkable office in
[17:55] (1075.76s)
Moscow, another set of hackers is
[17:57] (1077.60s)
quietly at work. This group is known as
[18:00] (1080.08s)
Cozy Bear, most likely working under the
[18:02] (1082.24s)
SVR, Russia's foreign intelligence
[18:04] (1084.16s)
service. They've been inside the
[18:05] (1085.92s)
Democrats network since June 2015, far
[18:08] (1088.80s)
longer than Fancy Bear. As strange as it
[18:11] (1091.12s)
sounds, Cozy and Fancy Bear probably
[18:12] (1092.72s)
weren't even aware of each other. They
[18:14] (1094.32s)
had different bosses, didn't talk,
[18:16] (1096.16s)
didn't collaborate. Cozy Bear is known
[18:18] (1098.64s)
for being quiet and methodical,
[18:20] (1100.32s)
targeting all kinds of institutions
[18:21] (1101.76s)
without leaving much of a trace. But
[18:23] (1103.68s)
this time, someone's watching them. In
[18:25] (1105.76s)
2014, Dutch intelligence pulled off an
[18:27] (1107.84s)
incredible hack. They gained access to
[18:29] (1109.92s)
surveillance cameras in the very
[18:31] (1111.12s)
building where Cozy Bear operates.
[18:33] (1113.12s)
They're literally watching the hackers
[18:34] (1114.64s)
at work. That's how they realize Cozy
[18:36] (1116.88s)
Bear is crawling through the DNC
[18:38] (1118.16s)
systems. So, the AIVD warns the American
[18:41] (1121.20s)
counterparts early on. That warning
[18:43] (1123.68s)
eventually reaches the FBI. By September
[18:46] (1126.08s)
2015, an agent in Washington calls the
[18:48] (1128.24s)
DNC to let them know Russian hackers are
[18:50] (1130.32s)
inside their systems, but the warning
[18:52] (1132.40s)
goes nowhere.
[18:54] (1134.16s)
The call lands with lower level IT staff
[18:56] (1136.24s)
and is more or less ignored. Senior
[18:58] (1138.48s)
leadership at the DNC later claimed they
[19:00] (1140.24s)
didn't even know about it at the time.
[19:02] (1142.24s)
The hackers could have been discovered
[19:03] (1143.60s)
much earlier. If anyone had looked more
[19:05] (1145.76s)
closely at Cozy Bear, they likely would
[19:07] (1147.36s)
have seen Fancy Bear, too. And if that
[19:09] (1149.36s)
had happened, the summer of 2016 might
[19:11] (1151.68s)
have unfolded quite differently.
[19:17] (1157.44s)
But it didn't.
[19:20] (1160.40s)
Back to spring 2016, Fancy Bear launches
[19:23] (1163.60s)
a website, dcaksaks.com,
[19:26] (1166.00s)
and starting in June, they begin
[19:27] (1167.44s)
dropping bombshell after bombshell. They
[19:29] (1169.60s)
invent a fake identity, Guifer 2.0, a
[19:32] (1172.64s)
supposed Romanian lone wolf behind all
[19:34] (1174.48s)
the leaks. Guucifer gets a blog, reaches
[19:37] (1177.20s)
out to journalists, and offers up stolen
[19:39] (1179.12s)
files. The DNC hack dominates the
[19:41] (1181.68s)
headlines. It becomes breaking news on
[19:43] (1183.52s)
TV. Suddenly, internal dirt from within
[19:45] (1185.44s)
the Democratic Party. Rumors, backroom
[19:47] (1187.60s)
deals, tensions is out in the open. It's
[19:49] (1189.60s)
a major blow to Hillary Clinton's
[19:51] (1191.12s)
campaign. The emails appear to show the
[19:53] (1193.36s)
DNC clearly favoring Clinton over Bernie
[19:55] (1195.28s)
Sanders, even though they were supposed
[19:56] (1196.88s)
to stay neutral. There's content about
[19:59] (1199.04s)
what she earned for Wall Street speeches
[20:00] (1200.72s)
and even alleged anti-atholic bias.
[20:04] (1204.00s)
Trump jumps on the scandal. At a rally,
[20:06] (1206.40s)
he famously says, "Russia, if you're
[20:08] (1208.56s)
listening, I hope you're able to find
[20:11] (1211.04s)
the 30,000 emails that are missing. I
[20:15] (1215.92s)
think you will probably be rewarded
[20:18] (1218.32s)
mightily by our press.
[20:20] (1220.00s)
At that point, Clinton is already under
[20:21] (1221.76s)
pressure over her use of a private email
[20:23] (1223.60s)
server while serving as Secretary of
[20:25] (1225.20s)
State. The FBI confirms she also deleted
[20:28] (1228.08s)
private emails from that account, which
[20:30] (1230.16s)
makes people believe that she's hiding
[20:31] (1231.60s)
something. Trump seizes the moment,
[20:33] (1233.52s)
tying that controversy to the flood of
[20:35] (1235.20s)
new leaks. That very same day, Fancy
[20:37] (1237.84s)
Bear sent 76 spear fishing emails to
[20:39] (1239.76s)
Clinton's staff. The impact of the leaks
[20:42] (1242.08s)
on Clinton's campaign is huge. Maybe not
[20:44] (1244.08s)
the deciding factor, but they definitely
[20:45] (1245.68s)
give Trump a boost over and over again.
[20:48] (1248.80s)
What started as chaos turned into
[20:50] (1250.40s)
something more focused, a clear attempt
[20:52] (1252.32s)
to help Donald Trump. Just over a month
[20:54] (1254.80s)
before election day, the hackers hand
[20:56] (1256.56s)
over John Podesta's emails to Wikileaks.
[20:59] (1259.36s)
And then week after week, those emails
[21:01] (1261.44s)
are released strategically, some more
[21:03] (1263.28s)
dramatic than others, but all grabbing
[21:05] (1265.12s)
headlines. The constant drip of leak
[21:07] (1267.76s)
material creates a lasting impression.
[21:10] (1270.00s)
Something shady is going on inside the
[21:11] (1271.60s)
Democratic party. Clinton loses
[21:13] (1273.68s)
momentum. She's forced to shift her
[21:16] (1276.00s)
message and constantly defend herself in
[21:17] (1277.84s)
the press and directly against Trump in
[21:19] (1279.60s)
public debates. The leaks are part of
[21:22] (1282.16s)
something bigger. Fancy Bear is
[21:24] (1284.00s)
supported by a digital army of trolls.
[21:26] (1286.16s)
For example, operating out of this
[21:27] (1287.68s)
building in St. Petersburg. They flood
[21:29] (1289.84s)
social media with manipulated content
[21:31] (1291.52s)
and polarizing posts. Some even succeed
[21:34] (1294.00s)
in organizing real life protests across
[21:35] (1295.84s)
multiple US cities.
[21:37] (1297.83s)
[Music]
[21:41] (1301.36s)
Hillary Clinton loses. Donald Trump
[21:44] (1304.00s)
becomes president. It's nearly
[21:45] (1305.92s)
impossible to measure how much influence
[21:47] (1307.52s)
the hacks and disinformation had,
[21:49] (1309.28s)
whether they tipped the scales, but many
[21:51] (1311.36s)
experts like Kathleen Hall Jameson agree
[21:53] (1313.68s)
they had an impact. Russia to some
[21:55] (1315.92s)
extent successfully interfered with the
[21:57] (1317.68s)
2016 US election.
[22:02] (1322.16s)
It's widely seen as the most effective
[22:03] (1323.76s)
hack and leak operation ever pulled off.
[22:06] (1326.32s)
steal data, release it strategically,
[22:08] (1328.24s)
and fan the flames of chaos. The idea
[22:10] (1330.88s)
that states spy on each other isn't new.
[22:13] (1333.12s)
But taking that intelligence and
[22:14] (1334.40s)
throwing it into the public to
[22:15] (1335.52s)
deliberately sway an election, that's
[22:17] (1337.28s)
something else entirely. If hackers can
[22:19] (1339.44s)
get their hands on internal data,
[22:20] (1340.72s)
release it at the perfect moment, and
[22:22] (1342.32s)
shape public opinion, what does that
[22:24] (1344.08s)
mean for the future of democracy? If a
[22:26] (1346.24s)
foreign power can mess with the core of
[22:27] (1347.68s)
another country's democratic process,
[22:29] (1349.76s)
that's not just hacking. That's
[22:31] (1351.20s)
destabilization. And it's part of a
[22:33] (1353.28s)
broader pattern made to erode public
[22:34] (1354.80s)
trust in democratic institutions.
[22:36] (1356.80s)
Democracies are at a disadvantage in
[22:38] (1358.48s)
this fight. A dictatorship can flood the
[22:40] (1360.80s)
internet with state media, bots, fake
[22:42] (1362.56s)
accounts, leak operations and watch as
[22:44] (1364.64s)
the public sphere and open society
[22:46] (1366.08s)
fragments and turns against itself.
[22:49] (1369.20s)
Meanwhile, inside the authoritarian
[22:50] (1370.88s)
regime, nothing wobbles. Descent is
[22:53] (1373.36s)
crushed quickly and publicly.
[22:56] (1376.24s)
The United States only realizes what
[22:58] (1378.00s)
just happened after the elections have
[22:59] (1379.44s)
already passed. The CIA, FBI, and NSA
[23:02] (1382.64s)
compiled their findings in a highly
[23:04] (1384.08s)
classified report. In early 2017, a
[23:06] (1386.80s)
redacted version is released to the
[23:08] (1388.40s)
public. One sentence stands out as
[23:10] (1390.48s)
especially alarming. We assess that
[23:12] (1392.56s)
Moscow will apply lessons learned from
[23:14] (1394.24s)
its campaign aimed at the US
[23:15] (1395.76s)
presidential election to future
[23:17] (1397.28s)
influence efforts worldwide. The sheer
[23:19] (1399.60s)
aggression and skills of these cyber
[23:21] (1401.04s)
operations, especially in the US, opens
[23:23] (1403.52s)
many people's eyes. They realize this
[23:26] (1406.08s)
isn't just spying, it's sabotage.
[23:29] (1409.28s)
In Germany, alarm bells start ringing,
[23:31] (1411.12s)
too. There's a federal election coming
[23:32] (1412.80s)
up in 2017. What does all of this mean
[23:35] (1415.60s)
for them?
[23:37] (1417.28s)
Then a new website pops up. Btleags.com.
[23:40] (1420.88s)
BT like Bundist. Just like dleaks.com.
[23:45] (1425.44s)
Suddenly, everyone is on edge.
[23:47] (1427.36s)
Variations like btleaks.org start
[23:49] (1429.28s)
appearing too. German authorities notice
[23:51] (1431.44s)
that someone is registering these sites
[23:53] (1433.44s)
and panic starts to set in. Is the world
[23:55] (1435.68s)
about to see a repeat of the US
[23:57] (1437.20s)
playbook?
[23:59] (1439.28s)
In early May 2017, Angela Merkel travels
[24:02] (1442.16s)
to Russia for the first time since the
[24:03] (1443.76s)
Bundesog hack. She meets Putin at his
[24:06] (1446.40s)
summer residence in Sochi. There she
[24:08] (1448.56s)
confronts him. Putin insists that Russia
[24:10] (1450.88s)
never interferes in the internal affairs
[24:12] (1452.64s)
of other nations. Merkel replies firmly,
[24:15] (1455.52s)
"I assume that German parties will
[24:17] (1457.04s)
handle their election campaigns among
[24:18] (1458.64s)
themselves. A clear warning, stay out."
[24:22] (1462.48s)
In the end, the 2017 German election
[24:24] (1464.56s)
isn't rocked by any major leaks. To this
[24:27] (1467.20s)
day, no one knows for sure what happened
[24:28] (1468.72s)
to the stolen 16 GB from the Bundesto
[24:31] (1471.36s)
hack. There's never been a single public
[24:33] (1473.20s)
leak directly tied to that data. But
[24:35] (1475.44s)
then again, maybe there doesn't need to
[24:37] (1477.20s)
be. Maybe the information was used in
[24:39] (1479.20s)
some other way. Quietly, tactically.
[24:43] (1483.28s)
Meanwhile, the hunt for Scaramooch
[24:45] (1485.12s)
continues. It'll be a while before his
[24:47] (1487.44s)
identity is finally confirmed.
[24:50] (1490.27s)
[Music]
[24:55] (1495.66s)
[Music]
[25:08] (1508.72s)
Some of his colleagues aren't so lucky.
[25:11] (1511.98s)
[Music]
[25:14] (1514.16s)
Chapter 3. The cleaning crew.
[25:22] (1522.00s)
April 10th, 2018, a passenger plane from
[25:25] (1525.28s)
Moscow lands at Skipple airport in the
[25:27] (1527.28s)
Netherlands. Among the passengers, four
[25:30] (1530.32s)
Russian men. They look like typical
[25:32] (1532.48s)
business travelers, Alexe Minion and
[25:35] (1535.12s)
Alexnikov. Both in their 40s, seem
[25:37] (1537.36s)
cheerful. Behind them walk two younger
[25:39] (1539.92s)
men, Yfgenei Seabriokov and Alexe
[25:42] (1542.48s)
Morenitz. According to their passports,
[25:45] (1545.12s)
they're diplomats. A sharply dressed man
[25:47] (1547.36s)
from the Russian embassy meets them in
[25:49] (1549.12s)
arrivals and escorts them out of the
[25:50] (1550.72s)
airport.
[25:52] (1552.00s)
But they aren't here on official duty.
[25:53] (1553.92s)
They're part of a special unit trained
[25:55] (1555.84s)
to carry out covert foreign operations.
[25:58] (1558.64s)
Minion and Sutnikov handle
[26:00] (1560.24s)
reconnaissance. Seriov and Minit are the
[26:03] (1563.36s)
hackers. They rent a small car and drive
[26:06] (1566.08s)
to the H. They stop at an electronic
[26:08] (1568.72s)
store to buy a heavy duty 12vt battery
[26:10] (1570.72s)
and a charger, then check into a hotel.
[26:15] (1575.28s)
The next day, Minion heads to OPCW, the
[26:18] (1578.40s)
Organization for the Prohibition of
[26:19] (1579.84s)
Chemical Weapons. That's an
[26:21] (1581.60s)
international body that investigates
[26:23] (1583.04s)
chemical weapons use and checks
[26:24] (1584.56s)
compliance with global conventions. The
[26:26] (1586.96s)
OPCW has just finalized its report on a
[26:29] (1589.28s)
high-profile case. Sergey Scrippal and
[26:32] (1592.08s)
his daughter Julia were found
[26:33] (1593.36s)
unconscious on a bench in Salsbury, UK,
[26:35] (1595.84s)
after being poisoned with Novach, a
[26:38] (1598.08s)
nerve agent developed in Russia. The
[26:40] (1600.80s)
OPCW report confirms the British
[26:42] (1602.80s)
findings.
[26:45] (1605.04s)
Minan scouts the site. He photographs
[26:47] (1607.28s)
the OPCW building and the Marriott Hotel
[26:49] (1609.84s)
next door. 2 days later, April 13th, the
[26:53] (1613.28s)
group plans to strike. Time is short.
[26:57] (1617.04s)
What they don't realize is that they're
[26:58] (1618.64s)
being watched. From the moment they set
[27:00] (1620.56s)
foot into the country, they've been
[27:01] (1621.92s)
under surveillance by the Dutch Military
[27:03] (1623.52s)
Intelligence Service, MIVD. For the
[27:06] (1626.48s)
original version of this documentary, we
[27:08] (1628.24s)
interviewed a senior MIVD official. Due
[27:10] (1630.56s)
to Wright's restrictions, we had to cut
[27:12] (1632.08s)
those segments from this adaptation. He
[27:14] (1634.08s)
couldn't help but grin when describing
[27:15] (1635.52s)
their transport. A rather small car for
[27:17] (1637.60s)
a bunch of guys tightly cramped in
[27:19] (1639.60s)
there. The agency follows them closely,
[27:21] (1641.92s)
but how did they even know to look for
[27:23] (1643.44s)
them? Apparently, the MIVD received
[27:25] (1645.92s)
intelligence that members of APT28 would
[27:28] (1648.48s)
be flying in. Fancy bear again.
[27:31] (1651.36s)
According to the Guardian, the original
[27:32] (1652.88s)
tip may have come from British
[27:34] (1654.08s)
intelligence.
[27:36] (1656.40s)
April 13th, the operation begins. The
[27:39] (1659.36s)
four men drive to the Marriott Hotel and
[27:41] (1661.52s)
park close to the OPCW building. The
[27:43] (1663.92s)
car's rear faces the compound. The trunk
[27:46] (1666.56s)
is packed with equipment.
[27:48] (1668.64s)
The battery and a voltage regulator
[27:50] (1670.32s)
power a computer which is connected to a
[27:52] (1672.64s)
laptop in the front. Sarah Briakov and
[27:55] (1675.36s)
Morinets use it to execute the hack. The
[27:58] (1678.00s)
key component is a flat panel Wi-Fi
[27:59] (1679.76s)
antenna hidden under a jacket connected
[28:02] (1682.08s)
via USB. It mimics the OPCW's real Wi-Fi
[28:05] (1685.68s)
network. Devices inside might
[28:07] (1687.52s)
autoconnect, believing it's legit. Once
[28:10] (1690.08s)
they connect, the hackers can steal
[28:11] (1691.52s)
credentials. With those, they could slip
[28:13] (1693.92s)
into the OPCW's internal network. The
[28:16] (1696.56s)
likely goal, steal or undermine the
[28:18] (1698.16s)
scrile findings or discredit the
[28:20] (1700.00s)
organization through a leak.
[28:23] (1703.12s)
But they don't get that far.
[28:26] (1706.00s)
Dutch authorities move in. Two unmarked
[28:28] (1708.40s)
vehicles roll quietly onto the lot. Then
[28:30] (1710.88s)
sudden action. Doors fly open. The four
[28:33] (1713.60s)
men are taken down. One tries to destroy
[28:35] (1715.84s)
his phone, kicking it repeatedly, but
[28:38] (1718.48s)
fails.
[28:40] (1720.32s)
Then comes the search. There's a plastic
[28:42] (1722.64s)
bag filled with trash from their hotel
[28:44] (1724.16s)
room, beer cans, receipts, a
[28:46] (1726.40s)
half-hearted attempt to cover their
[28:47] (1727.76s)
tracks. Also, €20,000 and $20,000 in
[28:52] (1732.00s)
Chris bills. Most incriminating of all,
[28:54] (1734.48s)
a taxi receipt in Morin's bag,
[28:57] (1737.12s)
documenting a ride from the GRU barracks
[28:59] (1739.04s)
to the airport on the day of departure.
[29:01] (1741.52s)
The team's devices tell an even bigger
[29:03] (1743.36s)
story. One phone was activated just the
[29:05] (1745.52s)
day before their trip. Its first signal
[29:07] (1747.76s)
pinged a tower right next to the GRU
[29:09] (1749.44s)
headquarters.
[29:10] (1750.96s)
The laptops reveal a broader mission
[29:12] (1752.64s)
trail. Seriov had been in Lusan in 2016
[29:16] (1756.64s)
likely targeting the World Anti-Doping
[29:18] (1758.40s)
Agency.
[29:19] (1759.28s)
Breaking news out of Loausanne,
[29:20] (1760.96s)
Switzerland, where Russia has been
[29:22] (1762.80s)
handed a 4-year ban by the World
[29:24] (1764.56s)
Anti-Doping Agency.
[29:26] (1766.16s)
In December 2017, he was in Koala Lumpur
[29:28] (1768.80s)
where he reportedly tried to hack the
[29:30] (1770.24s)
Malaysian police. The agency then
[29:32] (1772.16s)
investigating the MH7 plane crash.
[29:34] (1774.56s)
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 crash
[29:38] (1778.00s)
landed in eastern Ukraine.
[29:40] (1780.40s)
That flight was brought down by a
[29:41] (1781.68s)
Russian-made missile over eastern
[29:43] (1783.04s)
Ukraine. And the team wasn't planning to
[29:45] (1785.28s)
stop at the OPCW. They trained tickets
[29:47] (1787.92s)
from UTF to burn Switzerland, likely
[29:50] (1790.08s)
headed for the SPE laboratory, which was
[29:52] (1792.16s)
also analyzing Novach.
[29:55] (1795.52s)
Sometimes hackers need to get physically
[29:57] (1797.04s)
close to their targets. Sending fishing
[29:59] (1799.12s)
emails isn't enough. You need to know
[30:01] (1801.12s)
what kind of networks are in place, what
[30:02] (1802.88s)
security measures are active, and
[30:04] (1804.40s)
sometimes even watch the people going in
[30:06] (1806.00s)
and out. German journalists have
[30:08] (1808.16s)
nicknamed them the cleaning crew because
[30:09] (1809.92s)
they show up after something major has
[30:11] (1811.52s)
gone wrong and try to clean up or spin
[30:13] (1813.44s)
the story. For the MIVD, this was a
[30:15] (1815.84s)
major win and they decided to take it
[30:17] (1817.68s)
public. Usually, they don't disclose
[30:19] (1819.68s)
their operations, but this time they had
[30:21] (1821.84s)
a press conference 5 months later. The
[30:24] (1824.48s)
four men were eventually released and
[30:26] (1826.08s)
sent back to Russia, likely for
[30:27] (1827.60s)
diplomatic reasons. Their mistakes seem
[30:30] (1830.56s)
amateur-ish.
[30:32] (1832.16s)
Why keep that taxi receipt?
[30:35] (1835.28s)
Well, these aren't mythical hooded
[30:36] (1836.80s)
figures. They're civil servants, hackers
[30:39] (1839.20s)
on a schedule, assigned tasks, bad
[30:41] (1841.76s)
coffee, strict rules. They just happen
[30:44] (1844.00s)
to work for an authoritarian regime and
[30:45] (1845.92s)
weaponized code.
[30:48] (1848.56s)
Russia, of course, denies everything.
[30:50] (1850.80s)
The men were supposedly just on a
[30:52] (1852.32s)
routine trip. Of course, nothing screams
[30:54] (1854.96s)
routine like a flat panel antenna in the
[30:57] (1857.12s)
trunk.
[31:00] (1860.56s)
This strange hotel parking lot escapade
[31:02] (1862.72s)
shows something important. Putin's bears
[31:05] (1865.04s)
can be stopped. Germany has fended them
[31:07] (1867.36s)
off. A conservative linked NGO was
[31:09] (1869.76s)
targeted, but the attack failed. In
[31:12] (1872.32s)
France, McClo's 2017 campaign fended off
[31:15] (1875.04s)
a similar attack. And in the US, the
[31:17] (1877.52s)
response came loud and clear. In 2018,
[31:20] (1880.24s)
they decide to send a message. That
[31:22] (1882.40s)
February, the US Department of Justice
[31:24] (1884.08s)
indictes 13 Russian nationals and three
[31:26] (1886.08s)
Russian companies. They're accused of
[31:28] (1888.08s)
deliberately interfering with the
[31:29] (1889.28s)
American political system. Not long
[31:31] (1891.60s)
after, another sweeping indictment is
[31:33] (1893.36s)
released. This one focused specifically
[31:35] (1895.44s)
on Fancy Bear. The FBI outlines exactly
[31:38] (1898.16s)
how they trace the DNC hack back to
[31:39] (1899.84s)
individual Russian operatives. Multiple
[31:41] (1901.92s)
names are listed, all Russian citizens.
[31:44] (1904.32s)
According to the investigators, they
[31:45] (1905.76s)
work for Russian intelligence.
[31:48] (1908.00s)
The hackers remain safe in Russia. No
[31:50] (1910.08s)
arrests follow. But one thing is clear,
[31:52] (1912.56s)
much of the world is now off limits to
[31:54] (1914.24s)
them. And this isn't just about naming
[31:56] (1916.80s)
names. It's a clear line in the sand.
[31:59] (1919.92s)
There are boundaries and these
[32:01] (1921.12s)
operatives cross them.
[32:04] (1924.72s)
One name stands out to German
[32:06] (1926.08s)
investigators. One of the men listed is
[32:08] (1928.48s)
believed to use the alias Scaramoosh.
[32:10] (1930.72s)
The same alias linked to the VSC.exe
[32:13] (1933.04s)
program. His real name is Dmitri Badin.
[32:17] (1937.20s)
He's the man who broke into Angla
[32:18] (1938.72s)
Merkel's computer. Today he's 32 years
[32:21] (1941.60s)
old. Investigators found out quite a lot
[32:23] (1943.68s)
about him. They have photos of him.
[32:25] (1945.60s)
Young face, dark blonde hair, shoulder
[32:27] (1947.60s)
length now. He's from Kursk, married,
[32:30] (1950.48s)
reportedly has a daughter, lives in a
[32:32] (1952.56s)
town just south of Moscow. He listens to
[32:34] (1954.80s)
music while he works. Russian rock,
[32:37] (1957.12s)
techno. According to forensics, he even
[32:39] (1959.76s)
string football matches while hacking.
[32:41] (1961.52s)
He's a big fan of Cristiano Ronaldo,
[32:43] (1963.36s)
apparently.
[32:44] (1964.88s)
In many ways, he seems like an average
[32:46] (1966.48s)
guy, but he's a government hacker
[32:48] (1968.40s)
serving in a regime that targets Western
[32:50] (1970.08s)
democracies. In May 2020, the German
[32:52] (1972.96s)
federal public prosecutor files charges
[32:54] (1974.80s)
against Bodin as well.
[32:59] (1979.52s)
After the first wave of indictments in
[33:01] (1981.20s)
2018, Vladimir Putin sat down with NBC
[33:03] (1983.84s)
for an interview. There he was
[33:05] (1985.76s)
confronted with the allegations.
[33:07] (1987.84s)
13 Russians and three Russian-owned
[33:10] (1990.16s)
companies have been indicted by a
[33:11] (1991.92s)
special prosecutor named Robert Mueller
[33:13] (1993.68s)
in the United States for interfering in
[33:16] (1996.32s)
our election. Why would you allow an
[33:18] (1998.24s)
attack like this on the United States?
[33:22] (2002.08s)
Why have you decided the Russian
[33:23] (2003.60s)
authorities, myself included, gave
[33:26] (2006.08s)
anybody permission to do this?
[33:27] (2007.84s)
If the 13 Russian nationals plus three
[33:30] (2010.80s)
Russian companies did in fact interfere
[33:32] (2012.32s)
in our elections, is that okay with you?
[33:40] (2020.72s)
I don't care.
[33:42] (2022.16s)
I couldn't care less.
[33:45] (2025.60s)
Putin's bears were never captured. Their
[33:47] (2027.84s)
operations weren't dismantled. This
[33:49] (2029.92s)
isn't a story with a clean, satisfying
[33:51] (2031.68s)
ending. Quite the opposite.
[33:55] (2035.28s)
Chapter 4. The satellite.
[34:04] (2044.80s)
February 24th, 2022. A cold night in
[34:07] (2047.92s)
Moscow. The day has barely begun.
[34:14] (2054.11s)
[Music]
[34:17] (2057.36s)
A quiet man heads to work earlier than
[34:19] (2059.04s)
usual.
[34:20] (2060.64s)
He's riding the metro
[34:22] (2062.49s)
[Music]
[34:30] (2070.88s)
at Polyska station. He gets off. From
[34:33] (2073.68s)
there, it's a 10-minute walk.
[34:40] (2080.00s)
He's a little on edge. Lights a
[34:41] (2081.84s)
cigarette. He works for the GRU in the
[34:44] (2084.64s)
aquarium. He's part of unit 74455,
[34:48] (2088.88s)
better known abroad as Sandworm or
[34:50] (2090.56s)
Voodoo Bear. At his desk, he pulls up a
[34:53] (2093.76s)
chair. Time to go to work.
[34:57] (2097.44s)
[Music]
[35:00] (2100.88s)
He and his colleagues have spent months
[35:02] (2102.40s)
preparing for this moment. Now it's just
[35:04] (2104.48s)
a few final clicks.
[35:07] (2107.91s)
[Music]
[35:16] (2116.00s)
Meanwhile, in Austin, Texas, it's still
[35:17] (2117.84s)
February 23rd. A senior executive at
[35:20] (2120.64s)
Viasat, a satellite internet provider,
[35:22] (2122.88s)
is just settling into his evening.
[35:24] (2124.96s)
Visiat's tech is known for being
[35:26] (2126.48s)
dependable, especially in remote areas.
[35:29] (2129.68s)
Suddenly, his devices start lining up
[35:31] (2131.44s)
with automated warnings.
[35:33] (2133.60s)
They're coming from Ukraine. Two of
[35:35] (2135.60s)
Viasat's ground stations are under
[35:37] (2137.12s)
attack, flooded with malicious data
[35:38] (2138.96s)
packets.
[35:40] (2140.56s)
Internet from satellites doesn't
[35:42] (2142.00s)
actually come from space. It's routed
[35:43] (2143.68s)
through ground stations. If those crash,
[35:45] (2145.84s)
nothing gets through. And now they're
[35:47] (2147.76s)
overwhelmed. So overloaded, they can't
[35:50] (2150.08s)
deliver connectivity at all. But the
[35:52] (2152.16s)
Voodoo Bear operative in Moscow isn't
[35:54] (2154.00s)
finished yet. These kind of attacks can
[35:56] (2156.24s)
sometimes be fended off, but this one
[35:58] (2158.08s)
keeps escalating. Internet providers
[36:00] (2160.16s)
usually have remote access to their
[36:01] (2161.60s)
customers modems. That's how they push
[36:03] (2163.52s)
software updates. That access, of
[36:05] (2165.52s)
course, should be highly secure. In
[36:07] (2167.60s)
VSAT's case, it wasn't. Voodoo Bear had
[36:10] (2170.64s)
already infiltrated months earlier. The
[36:12] (2172.96s)
hackers send a command to the modems,
[36:14] (2174.80s)
forcing them to download malicious code
[36:16] (2176.56s)
that wipes login credentials stored on
[36:18] (2178.32s)
the devices. Without those credentials,
[36:20] (2180.72s)
the modems can't authenticate, can't
[36:22] (2182.40s)
connect, and go completely offline.
[36:25] (2185.44s)
The attack spreads fast. The senior
[36:27] (2187.68s)
manager stares at his screen in
[36:29] (2189.04s)
disbelief. 30,000 modems across Europe
[36:31] (2191.44s)
are now nothing but e-waste. In Germany,
[36:34] (2194.24s)
5,800 wind turbines go offline. In a
[36:37] (2197.20s)
small village in Sweden, the internet
[36:38] (2198.88s)
vanishes. And in Ukraine, VSAT's biggest
[36:41] (2201.60s)
customer
[36:44] (2204.16s)
is the military.
[36:47] (2207.52s)
Suddenly, across army installations,
[36:49] (2209.44s)
there's tension.
[36:52] (2212.64s)
The communication infrastructure is
[36:54] (2214.16s)
being hit. Write as reports flood in
[36:56] (2216.80s)
from the borders. Russian troops and
[36:58] (2218.88s)
armored vehicles are pouring in. The
[37:01] (2221.12s)
invasion, long looming like fog, has
[37:03] (2223.28s)
begun.
[37:05] (2225.28s)
Ukraine is hit from three directions.
[37:07] (2227.60s)
Missile strikes. Commands are shouted.
[37:11] (2231.36s)
And amid the chaos, a terrifying thought
[37:13] (2233.28s)
spreads. What if the comms go down? What
[37:16] (2236.16s)
if the command dashboards fail?
[37:18] (2238.56s)
Surveillance feeds cut to black.
[37:23] (2243.12s)
The VSAD attack was a highly effective
[37:25] (2245.04s)
cyber strike, perfectly timed with the
[37:27] (2247.12s)
invasion. But for Ukraine, it wasn't a
[37:29] (2249.36s)
new experience. Ukraine has been in
[37:31] (2251.60s)
Russia's cyber crosshairs for years, not
[37:33] (2253.76s)
just since the invasion in 2022, but
[37:35] (2255.92s)
dating back to 2014 after the annexation
[37:38] (2258.40s)
of Crimea. That year, Russia tried to
[37:41] (2261.04s)
hack Ukraine's elections. In 2015 and
[37:43] (2263.52s)
2016, Voodar took down parts of the
[37:45] (2265.68s)
country's power grid, each time for
[37:47] (2267.44s)
hours. In 2022, they tried again. This
[37:51] (2271.04s)
time, they failed. Russia often tests
[37:53] (2273.44s)
tactics like election interference in
[37:55] (2275.12s)
Ukraine before deploying them elsewhere.
[37:57] (2277.44s)
That's why Ukraine is sometimes called
[37:58] (2278.96s)
Russia's cyber test battlefield. The war
[38:01] (2281.68s)
has now been raging for over 3 years and
[38:03] (2283.68s)
all of Putin's bears are involved. They
[38:06] (2286.32s)
attack government systems and major
[38:07] (2287.92s)
companies. They spy, they leak, they
[38:10] (2290.80s)
fuel disinformation campaigns. But
[38:13] (2293.20s)
Ukraine, it seems, is defending itself
[38:14] (2294.88s)
formidably, not just on the ground, but
[38:17] (2297.12s)
also in cyerspace. And they're not
[38:19] (2299.36s)
alone. Today the country is supported by
[38:21] (2301.44s)
several leading western cyber security
[38:23] (2303.12s)
firms.
[38:26] (2306.00s)
Epilogue trains.
[38:29] (2309.20s)
Putin's bears are still out there as
[38:31] (2311.28s)
dangerous as ever.
[38:32] (2312.00s)
As ever.
[38:33] (2313.44s)
Harken Tan Rivera is one of the
[38:35] (2315.44s)
journalists we interviewed for this
[38:37] (2317.20s)
video. Not long ago, a colleague of his
[38:40] (2320.24s)
received a mysterious leak. A batch of
[38:42] (2322.96s)
internal documents from a Russian
[38:45] (2325.20s)
company called NTC Vulcan. It supplies
[38:49] (2329.20s)
Russian intelligence services and the
[38:51] (2331.28s)
military with cyber weapons of all
[38:53] (2333.36s)
kinds, and their internal documents are
[38:56] (2336.64s)
chilling.
[38:58] (2338.24s)
Among other things, Russia seems to have
[39:01] (2341.12s)
been mapping out what to do once a
[39:03] (2343.36s)
territory is conquered, how to bend it,
[39:06] (2346.48s)
break it, remake it.
[39:09] (2349.60s)
Beyond that, they're experimenting with
[39:12] (2352.24s)
control over foreign critical
[39:14] (2354.16s)
infrastructure.
[39:15] (2355.68s)
For example, they're testing if they can
[39:18] (2358.16s)
slow down trains.
[39:20] (2360.56s)
And if you can slow down a train, well,
[39:24] (2364.00s)
then you can speed it up, too.
[39:27] (2367.44s)
One thing is certain. We haven't heard
[39:30] (2370.56s)
the last of the bears. Not by a long
[39:33] (2373.60s)
shot. And in the years ahead, we'll have
[39:37] (2377.04s)
to stay alert. Learn to spot their
[39:39] (2379.68s)
traps, their tricks, their carefully
[39:42] (2382.80s)
laid bait.
[39:46] (2386.16s)
Because once they're inside,
[39:48] (2388.88s)
it rarely ends well.
[40:08] (2408.63s)
[Music]